REVIEWS by unknown
REVIEWS
SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD I. SELDEN
SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS, VOL. 55. Edited by G. 0. Sayles. London:
Bernard Quaritch, 1936. Pp. clxx, 222. $13.00.
WE HAVE become so accustomed to expect the volumes published by the
Selden Society to show a high standard of editing, that no statement as to
this particular need ordinarily be made when a volume is reviewed. But
volume 55 is an unusually satisfactory piece of woik, even for the Selden
Society. Mr. Sayles has given us not only some very fine editing-and we
may add, also, a model translation-of the cases themselves, but he has pre-
faced these cases with a series of short monographs, that constitute not so
much an introduction to the actual cases as a discussion of some of the more
intricate and less understood points in connection with the earlier history
of the court of King's Bench.
This preliminary matter is lengthy and excellent, and shows the result of
extensive research. It is so heavily documented that any adequate consider-
ation of it is quite impossible within the limits of a review. A not incon-
siderable portion of it has to do with matters so technical and controversial,
that any profitable discussion of it would require the same sort of detailed
treatment which the editor has used. The subject on which there has been
the greatest diversity of opinion is the one first taken up-the evolution of
the King's Bench before 1272. So many troublesome problems are involved,
that a definitive solution of them all would be impossible within the limits
of the space Mr. Sayles has allowed himself for a discussion of them. He
does not settle, and does not profess to have settled, the many points in dis-
pute. "In view of the division of opinion on so many crucial points, we have
been content for the most part, in discussing the early history of the king's
bench, simply to reflect the present state of knowledge and point attention
to the problems. At times, however, we have ventured to put forward some-
what different interpretations from those generally accepted." We doubt
whether all of Mr. Sayles' interpretations will be generally accepted. We are
certain, however, that the many new facts which he has assembled to support
his general thesis have brought the problem much nearer to a satisfactory
solution.
Under The Judges of the King's Bench there has been collected a really
large amount of new information, largely of a biographical nature, which the
editor himself calls a "patch work" addition to Foss's biographies, but which
is decidedly more than that. The Clerks, the Marshall and other Officials
makes up the third chapter of the introduction. Here as elsewhere Mr. Sa'les
has made evident the rewards that come to one who has the energy and
conscientiousness to make a thorough-going examination of the vast amount
of material in the Public Record Office. Incidentally, he has also given the
lie to the often repeated statement that the drudgery of any considerable
searching of manuscript records inevitably incapacitates one from doing con-
structive work of any literary merit.
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The Attorneys and Pleaders in the Kings Bench is perhaps the best of
the introductory monographs. It is certainly the most interesting. Here
again there is an array of new facts, derived in no small measure from manu-
script sources, that gives us, in fairly full form, a general knowledge of the
subject. Many details are necessarily lacking: nor have we yet an answer
as to why, when and how there developed in England in the thirteenth
century a body of professional lay lawyers. The Custody of the Plea Rolls
describes the startlingly haphazard way in which these documents were cared
for-or rather, not cared for. Following the introduction are a number of
important appendices, the first four giving detailed information about the
judges of the King's Bench and Common Pleas during the reigns of Edward
I and Edward II (terms, years, fees, etc.), and the others containing docu-
ments necessary for a fuller understanding of many of the subjects which
have already been discussed.
The select pleas themselves form a group of one hundred twenty cases
from sixty-one different rolls. The selection has given us a group of un-
usually interesting and instructive cases, quite different from the typical run
of cases on any single roll. All of these rolls, by the nomenclature of the
Public Record Office, are known as Coram Rege rolls, under which term
are included also rolls from a much earlier period. The problem of when
the court coram rege became the court of King's Bench has been many times
considered by different writers. Since normally a plea roll gives its own
designation in its heading, it would seem that these headings might be of
some value as evidence, especially as they vary from period to period. But
with practically no exceptions the headings of the rolls used in this col-
lection are not given. Of the five which are given, three read "Placita corain
domino rege . . . ", one "Placita coram Radidpho de Hengham (and three
other justices) - . . another "Placita apud Sanctum Martinomn London'
corain Radulpho de Hcngham (and three other justices)
It is perhaps rash to take issue with one who has shown such ability in
editing as 'Mr. Sayles has demonstrated, but we must beg to differ with him
on one of his emendations-not because of the emendation itself, which after
all is a very minor matter. but because the reason underlying the emenda-
tion concerns a matter which is really important, namely the difference be-
tween roll and record. In case no. 39, justices in cyre, who had been ordered
to forward the record of a certain case, sent word that they could not send
their record "without William of Sahaam who at that time kept the principal
roll or without their other colleagues who are present in the king's parlia-
ment. Ideo mandatmn est lVillehno de Sahain quod recorduin etc. habeant
corain rege (at a certain date)." The editor has emended habeant to habeat,
as though William was the one who was to furnish the record--on the
thought, prestunably, that William was to produce the roll and thiat in pro-
ducing the roll he would be producing the record. But the scrihe of 1279
was undoubtedly correct in writing the plural habeant. The judges distinctly
1. With these may be compared the headings to be found preceding the coram
rege cases in BacroN's NOTE Boox. and those in PnuLomE, Comtm REm RoLL ron
1297 (British Record Society, 1898).
1937] 1265
say that they can not send, i.e., compile and send, the record without William
and their other colleagues. They do not say, because it would not be true,
that they can not send the record without the principal roll (primntum rotu-
lurn). The roll was not the recordum, and the record in this case was asked
from the judges as a group. so that it would necessarily be that of the group
as an entirety, and not that of any single one of them.2
Fortunately we have some very definite information in regard to the
rotulm primum as bearing on the record of the justices. Bracton, on f.
352 b of his treatise, takes up this very point. From his account it is per-
fectly clear that though the justices as a group had several rolls they had
only a single record. Their rolls should agree with the rotutuhu prinumn.
But they, some or all, might not agree. In that case the rotulnm primuln
was important, not because it became the record, but because it raised a
strong presumption (praesumptio vehemens) against the correctness of the
others which differed front it. This presumption would be accepted as fact
if the recordurn of the justices (when it was asked for) agreed with the
principal roll as against their own rolls. But when the record of the jus-
tices went contrary to the principal roll and agreed with the other rolls. the
praesumptio vehemens of the principal roll was overthrown. Even if the
judges in their record differ from all the rolls (ab omnibus roltlis discordent).
the record will stand.
In the thirteenth century we have not yet reached the time when roll
and record became synonymous. In this volume we see many records which
are quite evidently copied from rolls ;3 normally the record should agree with
the roll; the justices may be told to search their rolls and send the record ;4
but still the roll is not the record; theoretically, at least, it is only "an aid
for the memory of the judges." To such an extent is this true that even
after the cases in this volume we can find the bare word of one judge ac-
cepted as a record though it contradicted the roll of another judge." When
the justices are dead and can not themselves send a desired record of a
case, their rolls may be searched for the necessary information. 7 Then this
individual entry on the roll becomes a recordum, a, record of the roll, which
may be vouched.8 But the record of acting, living justices is not the record
of the roll; when their record is wanted, they will be asked for their record.
not for their rolls. Their record is the account which they forward (usually
under seal) on demand. These accounts, as records, will be filed apart from
the rolls in the ligula recordorum.
2. For another application of the same principle of the collective record see
BRACroN, f. 354b.
3. As on pp. 116, 158. 4. As on pp. 68, 176.
5. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISHLAW (1905) 670.
6. 1 ROLLS OF PARLIAMENT (1767) 84-5.
7. See pp. 147-148.
8. Pp. 19, 117. Cf. the contemporary Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. I 360. "we vouch the record
of the roll."
9. Pp. 28, 118, 129, 173.
Even the record from a private court may be filed in the ligula recordorum, p. 132.
But some of the records from local courts were filed in the file of writs (ligula brevilmn),
pp. 63, 180. Cf. p. 139.
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So well have the cases been chosen that it is hardly too much to say that
any one of them is worthy of comment, if not from the point of view of
legal history, at least because of their historical significance along some other
line. Though at least one of the cases brings out a medieval attitude of mind
which is almost as foreign to us as the Oriental's desire always to save
his face,10 some of the cases have a touch that makes them seem very close
to our own times. There is a very modern ring to the alleged sayings and
doings of a certain prophet of evil.' A case of encroachment is remedied
by orders of removal that might be pronounced by a court of today in a
modem action of ejectment.Y2 Understandable as any twentieth century
escapade is the story of the two sportive chaplains who had visited Gilbert's
house-"and when they had left that house Robert son of Gilbert went
into a certain room where he was to lie as usual and lit a candle, and the
chaplains saw it and threw snow-balls at the candle so that they put the
candle out. and for this reason the aforesaid Robert swore at them. And
the chaplains on hearing this forcibly entered the room and dragged Robert
out of that room."' 3 What looks like the case of an individual who, in a
spirit not unknown in our own age and generation, insisted on a little more
night life when his companions wished to retire, is the story of the parson
who would not let his fellow guests put out the candle when they went to
bed. but insistcd on its being kept lighted for him because he was going
out again. Unfortunately the parson stayed out so long that before he
came back the candle had burned down, fallen from its support, and started
a fire which totally destroyed the house.' 4
As illustrating some of the great variety of material available for the
student of legal history, the following cases may be considered, briefly, of
course. No. 24 makes very clear how definite and technical must be the
proof of birth of live offspring to enable a man to hold as tenant by the
curtesy the land of his late wife---"although it was proved by the jurors that
there was born of the aforesaid 'Margery a certain boy, who was called at
the naming of the women 'John,' yet because a woman is not admitted to
make any inquisition in the king's court, and it cannot be clear to the court
whether he was born a living boy or not, and he had not been seen by males
or heard by them to cry out and never by such was he seen alive, nor could
he be because it is not permissible that males should be present at such
intimate affairs, and similarly because it was proved by the jurors that never
by any males was he heard to cry out, it does not seem to the court that"
10. P. 28: "They say that the aforesaid Simon was once taken by the friends of
the aforesaid fatilda . . . in fornication with that Matilda in a certain room, and
in consequence he w-as compelled to do one of three things: either to plight her his
troth or lose his life or kiss her behind."
11. P. 51.
12. Case no. 98.
13. P. 178.
14. No. 120. This case should be compared with that in Y. B. 2 Hen IV. f. 18, pl. 6.
The actual facts of the first case fit perfectly the illustrations used for dicta by the-
judges in the second.
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the husband should hold as tenant by the curtesy.1a No. 25 is an action
for deceit brought against a defendant who had showed the complainant
a jar of choice honey as a sample and had then sold him a tub of honey
which was anything but as good as the honey in the jar.'0 No. 32 is a
case of a writ of right of advowson sued for the king, where the tenant puts
himself on a jury of the country, instead of on the grand assise, to determine
the question of greater right, this jury to be made up of twelve knights,
as the grand assise would have been.' 7 No. 33 helps to illustrate the well
known apartness of Chester from the rest of England; in this case a writ
and an assise, both according to the custom of Chester, come in for cri-
ticism.' 8 One of the longest cases in the book is No. 76, a case as interesting
as it is long, and having to do with the escheat of a convicted felon's lands.
No. 78 is a typical and instructive case of replevin of beasts.10 A number
of cases gives us first hand information on the law of debt at that period:
no. 57, where both the heir and the executors are involved in the debts of
the testator-incidentally the king has told the judges to do justice accord-
ing to the law merchant; no. 74, a good example of the recognizance;
no. 87, the record of an action of debt in a local court, without the king's
writ; no. 96, where mention is made of the fact that a certain person had
been excommunicated at the suit of another for a certain debt-the action
presumably having been brought in court christian. Nos. 101 and 114 are
two unusual and important cases on the maritime law of the day, the first
having to do with the customary law of jettisoning in order to save the
ship in time of stress and storm, and the second being concerned with the
seizure of a ship for an offence committed at sea.
The above brief resume of some of the cases which have struck my fancy
gives but a very inadequate idea of the wealth of information which is avail-
able in this collection for historians for whom the original rolls are not easily
accessible. From all such, thanks to Mr. Sayles and the Selden Society
are due.
GEORGE E. WOODBINE t
New Haven, Conn.
15. Cf. p. 81; and see BRACToN, f. 438.
16. Cases of the same type will be found in 1 SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCUANT
(Selden Society, 1908) 91, 102-03, 105-06.
17. Cf. pp. 84, 72.
18. Local custom in matters of law was of very great importance in England at
this time. For other cases bearing on this point see pp. 43-44, 63, 65. 82, 105-06, 126,
133, 137, 148, 156.
19. Cf. No. 93. No. 99 makes mention of the replevying of a man by the king's
writ. Before the introduction of the writ of habeas corpus, the writ of de homine
replegiando was not infrequently used.
tGeorge Burton Adams Professor of History, Yale University.
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THE PROMISE OF AmERICAN POLITIcs. By T. V. Smith.1 Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1936. Pp. xix, 308. $2.50.
LEGAL scholars have long been urging that lav is instrumental. Some
few have asked: instrumental for what? To achieve what social ends should
we, can we, shape our legal concepts? Here is an eloquent answer from an
author who is both a practical politician and a professional philosopher.
From a chaos of competing "isms" he seeks to create a political philosophy
-an "invigorating myth," "a moral vocation" - for our "middle-income
skill group." 2 He asks himself these questions: What ideals are practicable?
How can we use these to improve pressing conditions? How can vie come
to terms with impracticable ideals? Today multitudinous doctrines beat
upon the senses of the common man. Liberalism, socialism, fascism, com-
munism, anarchism -all these have a natural history, have causes like other
causes, and hence must have something to teach us. Each must be searched
for its practical wisdom.
For his moral base - his ultimate ideal - Professor Smith takes a pro-
perly conceived individualism. Politicians and a chosen few are not to be
allowed to "realize" themselves in a manner denied to other men through
the "rose-colored ambiguity" of the word. "We want to knowv what kind
of individualism they believe in, to whom it applies, and on what terms."
The kind of individualism they should believe in is that celebrated by prophets
and poets: an individuality of the mind, of the imagination; an individuality
that finds its chief joy in things cultural. Value is in "the significance and
enjoyment of things, rather than in the things themselves." "The more im-
portant goods for personality formation are not competitive." They can even
be increased by being shared. The ideal of rugged individualism is right,
"eternally right" in asserting that the human individual, human desire, is
all that really counts. But rugged individualism is not a practical ideal. It
has provided individuality ior too few individuals; it has not meant an equal
chance for all; "it concentrates upon competitive goods which for some men
to get means for other men to lose." Hungry men cannot achieve individ-
uality. "Life's higher values can be approached only through fulfilling the
lower ones." Individualism must not mean "a monopoly by a few upon the
concrete means of individuality."
From this moral base the author moves into politics. Liberalism is the
political philosophy that emphasizes most the individualism he likes. Pure
individualism is romance; it founders on the contradictory psychology of
anarchism; it is the form, historically, that anarchy has taken in America.
Liberalism recognizes "a social necessity" that must be mastered through
organization. How much organization? The test is moving, relative: the less,
the better - for individuals need room to grow the pleasures of the mind;
1. State Senator, Fifth District, Illinois; Professor of Philosophy, University of
Chicago.
2. The three quoted phrases I borrow from Lasswell, The Moral Vocation of the
Middle-Income Skill Group (1935) 45 INT. J. ETHIcs 127. Professor Smith acimowil-
edges debt to this article and to Lasswelrs recent books, NVoRLD PozaTics m PEnSoN.AL
INSECURITY (1935) and PouTics: Wno GETS Wn.,AT, WnE., How (193b).
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but enough must be had to secure an equal opportunity for all. Before this
"deeper right" to equality, the civil right of private property must yield.
Liberalism - expanded to its governmental maximum - takes in socialism.
Some forms of property are not incompatible with liberty and even enhance
personality; but "there is a point beyond which a government devoted to
liberty will not let private property alone." The final question is: "Who
can do the business best for the greatest number of people?" Here another
beauty of liberalism emerges. It seeks to answer this question by means that
promote individuality. Its technique is that of consent; it is based on the
theory that "each man is the best judge of what he desires." If in a world
of competing goods few of us do know what we want, how much less can
we know what another wants. "That society is best fitted to fulfil wants which
encourages the fullest participation of all men in its processes." It is best
because it develops the individual and puts his energy and intelligence at the
disposal of all citizens. Such a society must of course preserve as "natural"
rights inviolability of the person and freedom of thought and speech.
Fascism- Italian type; the German is summarily dismissed as blood-
thinking- comes next. This the author condemns for both ends and means.
It has no ethics: ethics is "the theory of the hope for a good life for all."
It is not individualism, "but individualism's bastard, pure egoism." To one
man only does it permit full individuality. Behind the mystical "nation" or
"state" stands lussolini, "who gluts himself on power and publicly gloats
over his glut." The technique of fascism is coercion. It lives on violence;
it breeds self-immolation, not individuality. Its only value is in its emphasis
upon "solidarity" - community, fraternity- which "enshrines the deepest
sense of security known to men." But the form in which this ideal is con-
ceived and the means adopted to secure it must brand fascism "as an ethical
pretender of the lowest order."
Communism receives kinder treatment. It is condemned not for its ends
but for its means. Communism is in fact a glorification of the ends of liber-
alism. Its major ideal is the maximum of individuality for all. What liber-
alism has done for castes, it would do for classes. The root difficulty of
capitalism is that most men must gain subsistence in a way that makes a
full life impossible. Communism, amidst other blessings, would give every
man an opportunity to train himself for anything he chooses and even to
shift jobs after choice. Sometimes this is carried to the impossible perfec-
tionism of a "state of society in which every individual can do as he damn
pleases." But, however moral the ends of communism, its means are of the
grossest immorality -completely divorced from the ends. They are fascist,
violent. The hope of an ultimate transition to non-violence is futile. Even
Lenin knew that men do not voluntarily renounce power. Men seek safety and
deference as well as wealth; the problem of control is not mastered but in-
tensified when their struggle is shifted to such intangibles. Imagine Stalin
voluntarily abandoning the broad expanse into which his ego has spread. The
Communist leaves unplanned, to luck, the one end - the classless society -
by which he justifies violence. The copy theory of knowledge ("as familiar
as John Locke") upon which the great dialectic is built is impotent to predict
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the future. Pending the promised withering away of a dictatorial state,
.'power is just sweet power behind the scenes."
In a chapter on Parliamentarianism the author studies techniques for mak-
ing each voice effective in government. The job is by compromise to create
..a general will" where none exists in fact. Here the practical politician in
the author appraises in a manner much too detailed for summary a number
of concrete suggestions for the improvement of representative gov'ernment
Americanism is the final title. Under this label the author assays our
prospects for a liberal democracy and elaborates his invigorating ideal. He
finds a "gerontocracy" of judicial review astride our democracy and most of
our advantages over other nations lost save "some vague cohesive force of
the 'American dream' of general opportunity and individual freedom." What
we need to forestall a drift toward either fascism or communism is the ancient
Greek ideal: the ideal that exemplifies "the life of the good man and the
good citizen as one and the same." The good man is a man who is good
for something; he must have that fecund attitude or habit we call skill-
"skill achieved through sacrifice and fulfilled in service." The acquisition of
skill through sacrifice gives a man integration, "a single self from a body of
discordant impulses ;" its exercise brings him deference as a reward for pro-
ducing something of value for himself and others. Here "is to be found the
highest human individuality and the deepest happiness of man." Here also
is a principle of social dynamics. "Inventions produce and are in turn pro-
duced by a public morale (highly potential of deference) which is the very
inwardness of good citizenship." 'Who are to be the carriers of this principle
of good citizenship? The skilled middle class- expanded to include some
25,000.000 persons. This group has "at its common heart a great moral
romanticism which can become economic realism through concerted action."
But for the accomplishment of this end it is imperative that we keep down
violence. A revolution to make the world safe for democracy is not likely
to achieve more success than did a war for the same purpose. To keep dovn
violence, the American politician must become a specialist, must acquire skill,
in the art of compromise. He must be "a man who can compromise an issue
without compromising himself." His vocation must be conciliation. It is in
our tolerance of this royal, yet elected, breed of politician - our willingness
to compromise "as regards all things which must be shared in order to go
along together," our common acceptance of a governmental duty to maintain
a standard of life, our concept of a private office as a public trust- that the
author finds the bright promise of American politics.
Such is a bare summary of a rich and persuasive book. To many its mes-
sage will appear obvious; but the quality of current discussions - of, for
e-amples, the sit-down strike and the President's Supreme Court proposal
-reaffirms the ancient adage that we need education in the obvious. A
reviewer bent on violence could of course find much to indict. Some critics
3. To demonstrate the application of his principles to practical problems the author
reprints as footnotes, throughout the book, speeches made by him in the Illinois Senate.
For wisdom, wit, and eloquence these set a standard of impossible perfectionism for
state senates.
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may say that the author's approach is not scientific or objective -that he
is merely trying to deck out his own errant prejudices as ethical verities. 4
From a logical point of view Professor Smith's ethical doctrines are, to be
sure, necessarily circular, that is, ultimately based on faith. But he is frank
to confess the old trick of "levitation by bootstraps." And how can any
ethical doctrine avoid the trick? Logic offers an infinite regress and science
knows no ethical absolutes. This does not mean, however, that talk about
ideals is futile. A sound psychology suggests that man has an irrepressible
desire to think that he is acting rationally toward preconceived ends and,
further, that goal words infused into a culture often become imbedded in
"conscience" as preludes to action. By what "objective" standard can a
realistic politician be blamed for taking advantage of this propensity of human
nature to spread his own ideals? Other critics may suggest that the author
nowhere develops his crucial concept of "individuality" into flesh and blood.0
That is perhaps a valid criticism of this book; but in an earlier volume, Beyond
Conscience,7 Professor Smith has tried to fill in his outline as far as our
present knowledge of psychology will permit. Revolutionist critics, more
violent still, may object that the author destroys his own case when he asserts
that men do not voluntarily relinquish power. The question is often asked:
How are liberals by democratic processes to dispossess those who control the
processes? To answer this, one can only reject its assumption about control;
recent history, in England and America at least, shows an increasingly rapid
expansion of socialistic liberalism. Finally, gradualist, and hence sympathetic,
reformers may complain that the author makes no effort to meet the critical
difficulty of drawing a line between what property is to be public and what
private. But even an ambidexterous author cannot be expected to overwhelm
heaven in one book; and the whole point of his philosophy is that there can
be no absolute line, but only a shifting one, relative to time and place, and
to be drawn by the political means of compromise.
In sum, I find Professor Smith's Utopia and his methods for getting there
practicable. Further knowledge about human nature may require changes in
blueprint and methods; but, while we await that knowledge, to law students
who want a picture of politics and ethics that is realistic, yet not devoid of
hope, I recommend both this book and its complement, Beyond Conscience.
,MYRES S. McDouGALt
New Haven, Conn.
4. Compare the criticisms that were made of the last chapter of Thurman Arnold's
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). See, e.g., Mechem, The Jurisprdmence of Despair
(1936) 21 IOWA L. REv. 669.
5. See his own review of the book, Two Authors in Search of a Rcvic er (1936)
47 INT. J. ETHICS 105.
6. Ibid.
7. SMITH, BEYOND CONSCIE NCE (1934).
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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CASES ON EQUITY. By Henry L. McClintock.' St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1936. Pp. xxiv, 1286. $6.00.
THOSE WHO have found dissatisfaction with some of the recent trends either
in the composition of casebooks or the treatment of Equity in the law school
curriculum, will take great comfort in this book. Its style is the soul of good
form, its content offends no convention. It is designed for use in two full
year courses of two hours a week. It covers virtually the whole field or-
dinarily thought of as equity-roughly the same field covered in the one
volume edition of Mr. Cook's casebook,2 but with somewhat different group-
ing of material and perhaps more emphasis on procedure.
The first 559 pages are devoted to a General Survey of Equity, the
remainder to Equitable Protection of Particular Interests. Chapter one
contains interesting and well chosen historical material. Then follows a
chapter of over 200 pages on the Nature of Equitable Relief. This treats
such things as parties, pleading, kinds of relief, the consequences of the
notion that equity acts in personam, the place and limit of discretion, and
the fusion of law and equity. Lack of equity jurisdiction is then distinguished
from a court's want of power, and the manner of raising the former defect
is dealt with. The next chapter explores the requirement of inadequacy
of legal remedy. There follows a consideration of incidental or substituted
legal relief, interpleader, bills of peace, bills quia timet, discovery and the
perpetuation of testimony.
The subjects of the first part of Book Two are specific performance, rescis-
sion, and reformation of contracts. The second part, entitled Property,
includes such matters as equitable conversion of land by contract, equitable
liens and servitudes, the prevention of injury to property (real, personal,
intangible) through tortious conduct, and quieting title. The two remain-
ing parts are short, taking up the protection of personal interests and public
interests (injunction against crime, etc.) respectively.
There is little unanimity of opinion as to whether a casebook editor should
try to be selective or exhaustive in presenting his material; witness the
divergent reactions to the monumental work of Messrs. Chafee and Simp-
son.3 No one could doubt to which of the warring camps the present editor
belongs. He says in his preface: "The value of the case method of study
of law is lost unless the casebook contains for each case enough of the facts
and of the reasoning of the court to enable the student to see the problem
as the court saw it and to understand the process by which the court reached
its conclusion, so far as that process is revealed in the opinion. When the
required number of cases is so presented, there is very little room for any-
thing else. That limited space has been mainly devoted to problems which
illustrate the application of the principles already considered to different facts,
and to footnotes which have been devoted mainly to the citation of law
review material, because of a belief that such material is the most valuable
commentary on the cases and is also the least accessible." And indeed there
1. Professor of Law. University of Minnesota.
2. CooK, CAsEs ox EQXmTY (2d ed. 1932).
3. CRAFEE AND SnEMsoN. CASES OV EQuirr (1934).
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is very little of "anything else" beside cases: A few historical selections from
texts, a few of the Federal Equity Rules, a very few statutes, (of all the
foregoing not more than a dozen or so pages), footnotes, and problems com-
prise the lot. The editor has fairly described his footnotes-and seldom do
they go far afield into collateral questions. The problems follow each sec-
tion. There are usually about four or five of them, and they consist in a short
statement of facts taken from an actual case (cited after each problem) and
end with a question as to the holding. Like the footnotes the problems stick
pretty closely to the material which has preceded them. There are no ex-
planatory or introductory parts in the text, very few in the footnotes. A
reasonably industrious student would be well able to cover all the material
cited in the footnotes and problems without devoting an undue amount of
time to the Equity course.
The cases themselves are well chosen and edited. Many recent ones appear
-a lot of them decided in this decade. Further, the cases are arranged ac-
cording to patterns which it is easy to follow- even without resort to the
editor's recently published textbook on Equity. 4 Its almost severe simplicity
of design and execution will commend this casebook to those who agree with
the notions of Mr. Chafee and Mr. Simpson about a separate place for equity
in the curriculum, yet are awed by the ambitious proportions of their excel-
lent work with its inevitably great demands upon a teacher. For my part
I came to this task predisposed to favor the fusion of law and equity in
the law schools as well as in practice. In the light, it may be, of my predis-
position, I find aid and comfort for my view in the present very adequate
application of the opposing one. The editor says:' "Courts, even in code
states, are still drawing the line between actions at law and suits in equity,
and our students must be prepared to practice before such courts . .
Whether the application of [equitable] principles to the various divisions of
the law is to be taught in connection with the common-law rules applicable
to the same field, or in a separate course in equity, is not of great importance,
but it can hardly be doubted that the principles themselves ought to be taught,
before an attempt is made to apply them." That the material should be
taught is clear. But it is all taught-and incidentally almost every one of the
component parts is given at least as much attention-in the Yale Law School,
where there is no separate course on Equity.
The grouping of the material in the present book seems to me, moreover,
to have certain defects. It does not present problems in the way they actually
appear to the modern practitioner, judge, or law reformer. True, the ancient
dualism has left its mark-perhaps indelibly-on our legal system. But no
common thread binds its various manifestations today-at least in the code
states. One will have many an occasion in practice to think of equitable doc-
trines, but it will be as a part of such problems as the availability of jury
trial, the joinder of parties and causes, the appropriateness of certain forms
of relief, or the existence of certain legal relations in various connections
scattered over the whole field of the substantive law. And the equitable aspect
4. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY (1936).
5. P.v.
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will be only one phase of larger problems, so that the mental habits and trains
of association inculcated by a separate treatment of equity will cut through
the most fruitful ways of thinking about them. The training is horizontal,
so to speak, while the approach to actual cases will perforce be vertical. There
is much in the first book, for instance, that bears on the question of joinder
of causes and parties, but it must be culled from under a number of variant
headings, such as Equitable Procedure, Incidental or Substituted Legal Re-
lief, Bills of Peace, where its really significant implications for the practitioner
are not always even suggested. Oi the other hand there is no mention of the
early code provisions as to joinder, no indication of their debt to equity or
of how the old distinctions were invoked to defeat the intent of the codifiers
so manifest in the light of the former practice, no recounting of the way
the more modern provisions reflect the scope given by liberal courts to bills
of peace. Later courses grooved to present day problems may, to be sure,
gather up appropriate loose ends, recapitulate, tie them together, lend them
an historical continuity and a unity in terms of existing institutions. But the
duplication which would be involved is regrettable. Nor does it seem to be
offset by the possibility of schooling another generation of lawyers in the
caste of thought which bred the "cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which
the infant Code received from the New York judges."
FLEMING JAMES, JR.t
New Haven, Conn.
A TREATISE ON THE TAXING POWER, WITH PARTIcuLAR APPLICATION TO
THE STATE INCO.ME TAX. By Walter K. Tuller.2 Chicago: Callaghan &
Co., 1937. Pp. xvii, 460. $8.00.
THIs is no ordinary manual from which lawyers may discover how to
advise their clients to keep their taxes down. Nor is it a study of the de-
cided cases made merely for the purpose of drawing forth general principles
and of indicating the probable course of decisions. Mr. Tuller has written
with strong feeling to establish a thesis. The thesis is that the income tax
laws of almost all the states are void under the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause they tax income from sources outside the state, because they do not
permit proper deductions, and because they tax at graduated rates. The
author seeks to prove the soundness of his views by a series of propositions:
An income tax is a tax on the source from which the income is derived.
To the extent that the income taxed is derived from property, the income
tax is a property tax; and the right to conduct a lawful business or pro-
fession ;s a property right as much as the right to receive income from tan-
gible or intangible property. Since no state may tax property outside its
jurisdiction, the state may not tax income from such property. And since
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Member of the Los Angeles, California, Bar.
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no state may levy a graduated ad valorem tax on tangible or intangible
property, no state may levy a graduated tax on income from such property.
Of course, Mr. Tuller recognizes that the courts have not wholeheartedly
accepted all these propositions. But in support of some of them Mr. Tuller
cites a number of cases, particularly recent state court decisions declaring
graduated income taxes void as violating state constitutional provisions re-
quiring uniformity.2 The centerpiece of the argument is the Pollock case;3
in this case, he correctly reminds us, all the justices agreed that the income
tax had the effect of a tax on property.4 Unfortunately for the argument,
everything but the holding in the Pollock case has since been explained
away. And Lawrence v. State Tax Commissioni, in upholding a tax levied
by the state of the taxpayer's residence on income received from a business
conducted in another state, implicitly recognizes that income taxes are not
subject to the rules applicable to other taxes affecting business or property.
Mr. Tuller calls the decision "simply wrong." But the recent Cohn case,0
sustaining the taxation of income derived by a resident from foreign real
estate, has clinched the argument against Mr. Tuller.
It is evident that the author of this interesting though repetitious book
dislikes the prevalent theories of taxation and writes with an eye to the
courts to protect those who have income to be taxed. He speaks eloquently
of the courts as protectors of our liberty- with no glance at the fate of
unpopular minorities7- and wishfully assumes that the Constitution was
written to protect the individual from the government's power to affect him
by taxation. Apparently he forgets that the limitations upon the power of
taxation actually found in the Federal Constitution do not touch the prob-
lems with which he deals. While it is true that in the early cases before the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court restricted state
power to tax when it reached matters not subject to its jurisdiction,8 the
words of the original Constitution do not require this result, and in the later
cases we are dealing principally with the elastic due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The difficulty with the writer's position is the assumption that the matter
is settled by defining an income tax as a tax on property. The income tax,
Mr. Tuller maintains, has no distinctive qualities. It is not an excise tax;
2. E.g., Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579. 182 N. E. 909 (1932) ; Kelley v. Kalodner,
320 Pa. 180, 181 At]. 598 (1935) ; Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81
(1933).
3. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.. 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
4. But see Mr. Chief Justice White's distinction of the Pollock case in Brushaber
v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 16 (1916), approved in New York ex rel. Cohn
v. Graves, 57 Sup. Ct. 466, 468 (1937).
5. 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
6. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves. 57 Sup. Ct. 466 (1937), aff'g 271 N. Y.
353, 3 N. E. (2d) 508 (1936), (1936) 46 YAU. L. J. 148. But cf. New York ex rel.
Whitney v. Graves, 57 Sup. Ct. 237 (1937) (a tax on profits from the sale of an
interest in a Stock Exchange membership treated as localized at the Exchange).
7. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) is cited, but in connection with the
argument that graduated taxes violate fundamental conceptions of justice.
8. Hays v. Pacific Mails S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1855).
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in constitutional lav a tax is labelled an "excise" only in order to differen-
tiate it from a "direct" tax. But otherwise the only question is whether
the tax is on property or on a privilege. The judges' careless use of the
term "privilege" is misleading:" a tax on the exercise of a lawful right is a
tax on property; only when the legislature may take away the "right" alto-
gether is it proper to speak of a tax as on a "privilege." Hence inheritance
tax cases are not precedent for graduated income taxes.10
But under the due process clause the question always is whether the
tax is reasonable in view of the circumstances conditioning its imposition.
If it is necessary to have a theory, we may say that the tax is levied so that
those who benefit most by the protection of government may contribute
according to their abilities; income is the measure at once of benefit and
of ability. Perhaps logical consistency does not result in all cases; but the
law of taxation has never been distinguished for its adherence to logic.
In his conclusion Mr. Tuller expresses the hope that the states will aban-
don the income tax to the Federal Government and that the Federal Govern-
ment will leave the death tax to the states. He realizes that to accomplish
this end for all time the Constitution would have to be amended; but in
the meanwhile he expects the courts to do their duty and enforce the Con-
stitution "as it is written." Since there is nothing "written" in the Consti-
tution on the subject, Mr. Tuller really means that the courts should interpret
the document in accordance with his desires and those of others who oppose
all the principles of recent tax legislation. However, the matter appears to
be concluded, at least for the present, by the Colin case in which the Supreme
Court indicates an unequivocal preference for the opposite view.
Os3soND K. FRAEN.ELt
New York City.
REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN NEW JERSEY. By Al. C. WValtersdorf.
Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1936. Pp. 225. $2.50.
PROFESSOR Waltersdorf's study of utility regulation in New Jersey begins
with a brief historical sketch of the beginnings of utility service and the
development of commission regulation; devotes successive chapters to service
standards, valuation, depreciation, the rate of return, accounting, security
issues, and rate schedules; and concludes with a consideration of the special
problems of electric railways and motor busses and of the holding company
in New Jersey. The statutes and the fornal reports of the commission and
the courts provide the basic materials for the study. The treatment through-
out is descriptive, the presentation is compact and concise, and the critical
appraisal and recommendations are based on an acceptance of the system
of commission regulation of the privately owned and operated utility. The
9. See 11r. Justice Cardozo, dissenting, in Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393,
405 (1936).
10. Cf. Bromley v. *McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 138 (1929).
j.Member of the New York Bar.
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picture that emerges is one of regulation in a typical state, for New Jersey
has never been a leader in its approach to the problems of utility regulation.
Dr. Waltersdorf finds" that regulation in New Jersey has "fallen short
of attaining its full objective." The reasons for this failure are various:
"the laxity of public interest, adverse court decisions, inadequacies of the
existing laws, lack of Federal control to supplement state regulation, and
the general inability of the system of control to cope effectively with the new
conditions,"-the most important of the "new conditions" being the develop-
ment of the holding company system In New Jersey as elsewhere adverse
court decisions have presented serious obstacles to effective rate regulation.
But the Commission itself does not wholly escape responsibility for the in-
effectiveness of regulation; its quasi-judicial procedure and its lack of initia-
tive in inaugurating investigations are said to have left the public interest
without adequate representation; and its slavish adherence to the reproduc-
tion cost method has crippled rate-making at the start. In results, as well
as in regulatory methods, New Jersey's experience is unfortunately typical.
Dr. Waltersdorf's recommendations remain within the accepted regulatory
framework: public ownership and operation is undesirable because it is
characterized by serious "inherent" weaknesses; the modernization of the
statutes is essential; a definite standard for the determination of the rate
base would be helpful; commissions should become a professional group,
free from political interference, and should normally be reappointed when
their service has been satisfactory (only two of the seventeen Commissioners
appointed to office were reappointed at the expiration of their terms) ; and as
in all states adequate financing of the commission is necessary.
Reasonable as the conclusions and recommendations may be when the sit-
uation in a single state is considered, the cumulative evidence from studies
like this must lead those interested in effective control of private monopolies
to two conclusions: regulation has seldom had an opportunity to demonstrate
whether it can be made effective in the states; and, if regulation cannot be
made effective, the time has come to scrap the old forms of commission con-
trol and to institute new methods of control that promise more satisfactory
results for consumers and investors.
IRSTON R. BARNESt
New Hai'en, Conn.
"Assistant Professor of Political Economy, Yale University.
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